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Many who have seriously examined the matter are now persuaded thant
technological change is a major - and possibly the major contributor to the
economic growth and increase in productivity of nations.(l ) As a result,
interest in the process by which technological change occurs, and the "causes"
of success and failure, appears to be rising. Unfortunately, those studying
these issues cannot at the moment offer any simple prescription for innovation
success. As is the case with many social processes, numerous factors appear
to discriminate significantly between the successful and failing practice of
industrial innovation. But "numerous factors" are typically not of much
operational use to a policy maker or practitioner. Rather, a few strong, "oper-
ationally malleable" factors are needed which interested parties can and would
find it worthwhile to respond to.
Research to this end is being pressed on several fronts, but in the
present paper, we wish to focus on progress being made in one area only:
Understanding the role of the user in industrial product and process innovation.
It now appears that the innovation work by the user is more important than
previously recognized. Further, it now appears likely that a strong, operation-
ally malleable variable for the study and practice of innovation may be construc-
ted on measures of such user activity. In outline, this is so because:
* Careful examination of innovation practice in several industries
has shown that the level of the user involvement is often
unexpectedly large: Indeed, it now appears that users, rather
than first-to-market manufacturers actually are the designers of
many new industrial products and processes.
* Strategies appropriate to the management of innovation are
strongly impacted by the level of user involvement in the innovation
work.
* The level of user involvement in the innovation work appears to
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differ between industries, but appears to be quite consistent
from case-to-case within a given industry - thus suggesting
that it should be practical for firms to organize around the
pattern which may be dominant in their industry.
At the moment, the fact of high user involvement in the innovation
processes of some industries is reasonably well established, but the causes of
the various levels of involvement observed are not yet clearly understood. In
the sections which follow, we will begin by reviewing three categories of
empirical data which bear on the fact of user involvement in the industrial
innovation process: (1) The sources of designs for industrial product and
process innovations; (2) the sources of "ideas" for industrial product and
process innovations; and (3) the sources of problem statements for research
whose results were key to the development of industrial product and process
innovations. Next, we will discuss current hypotheses as to when and why
the user adopts a major role in the industrial innovation process, and finally,
we will consider the implications of what is currently known about the user's
role in that process.
II
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USERS AS DEVELOPERS OF
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIONS:
THE EVIDENCE TO DATE
Table 1 offers a summary of the results of all studies I am aware
of which provide empirical data on the "source" of successful industrial
product and process innovations - and which also meet a methodological criter-
ion which I have found key to obtaining accurate data on this matter. (This
criterion is reviewed - and excluded studies identified - in a later section of
this paper).
An initial glance at the data in Table 1 will show something very
interesting: Users seems to often be the most frequent "sources" of new product
and process innovations -. designing, building and using a home-made version of
a given innovation before a commercial version is available from any manufacturer.
Insert Table 1 Here
The frequency with which the studies summarized in Table 1 credit innovations
to product users rather than product manufacturers is striking, because the
conventional assumption is that product manufacturers are the developers of new
(10)products. Since this is so - and since the impact on innovation research and
practice would be considerable if the conventional assumption were proven often
incorrect (for example, the prescriptive literature on 'how to manage the
innovation process', is currently built around the conventional assumption) - I
should be especially clear about key definitions and methodologies by which some
of the studies in Table 1 have come to a different conclusion. To this end, I
will first provide an example of a user-developed industrial product to convey
the flavor of what may well be an alien concept to the reader, and then will
move on to a summary of key definitions and methoda.
Table 1: Empirical Data on the Source of Industrial Innovation
Nature of Innovations and
Sample Selection Criteria
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Innovation Source
n Usera Mfg.a
1. Knight (2)
2. Enos (3)
3. Freeman (4)
4. Berger (5)
5. Boyden (6)
6. Lionetta &
von Hippel (7)
Computer innovations 1944-62:
- systems reaching new performance
high
- systems with radical structural
innovations (level I)
Major petroleum processing
innovations
Chemical processes and process
equipment available for license,
1967
All engineering polymers developed
in U.S. after 1955 with >10mm pounds
produced in 1975
Chemical additives for plastics: All
plasticizers and UV stabilizers
developed post World War II for use
with 4 major polymers
All pultrusion processing machinery
innovations first introduced commer-
cially 1940-76 which offered users a
major increment in functional
utility
143 25%
18 33%
7 43%b
310 70%
75%
67%
14%b
30%
6 0% 100%
16 0% 100%
13 85% 15%
7. von Hippel (8) Scientific instrument innovations:
- first of type (eg. first NMR)
- major functional improvements
- minor functional improvements
8. von Hippel (9) Semiconductor and electronic
subassembly manufacturing equipment:
- first of type used in commercial
production
- major functional improvements
- minor functional improvements
7 100%
22 63%C
20 59%c
NA data excluded from percentage computations.
b Attribute missing percentage to independent inventors/invention development companies.
Attribute missing percentage to joint user-manufacturer innovation projects.
Study
4
44
63
100%
82%
70%
0%
18%
30%
0%
21%c
29%C
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Solderless Wrapped Connection:
A User-Developed Industrial
Product
The following example has been abstracted from an innovation history
developed for my study of innovation patterns in semiconductor and electronic
subassembly process equipment( 9) , and may be comfortably seen as a typical
example of innovation by product users:
Solderless wrapped connection is a means of making a gas-tight,
reliable electrical connection by wrapping a wire tightly around a special terminal
whose sharp edges press into the wire. The system is much faster than the pre-
ceeding system used to make such connections - soldering - and allows much closer
spacing of terminals.
The entire solderless wrapped connection system, including a novel
hand tool needed to properly wrap the wire around the terminal, was invented and
developed at Bell Labs for use in the Bell System in 1947-48. After several years
of testing by the labs, it was given to Western Electric for implementation.
Western Electric decided to have the hand tool portion of the system built by an
outside supplier and Keller Tool (now part of Gardner-Denver Company) bid for and
won the job in 1952-53. Keller engineers suggested some modifications to the Bell-
designed tool which they felt would make the tool easier to manufacture and operate
and, Western agreeing, began manufacture.
Keller had other customers who did electronic assembly work and realized
that some of these would also find the system useful. It therefore requested
and obtained a license to sell the tools on the open market. Currently, solderless
wrapped connection is a major wire connection technique and Gardner-Denver (Keller)
the major supplier of equipment for that use.
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Key Definitions and
Study Methods Used
The definitions and methodologies used by the several studies whose
results are summarized in Table 1 differ in many particulars. Nevertheless, some
general statements can be made, under the headings of definitions and sample
selection criteria, which the reader may find useful.
Key Definitions
* Innovation, as distinct from invention, is the first utilization of
a new product or process. In the usage of the studies reviewed here,
first utilization means first world use, not simply first use
within a particular firm.
* An innovation "user" uses an innovation but does not manufacture it
for sale. An innovation "manufacturer" manufactures an innovation for
sale but does not use it. The industries studied in Table 1 were in
the main structured in such a way that the distinction between the user
and manufacturer could be made quite clearly via organizational
boundaries: Few firms both used a given innovation and manufactured
it for sale. Two exceptions are (1) computer manufacturing firms,
which have many sophisticated uses for computers in-house, and (2)
petroleum product and chemical manufacturing firms (process users),
which often derive additional income from their process innovations
by licensing these to others. In three studies of these industries
I did not have access to detailed innovation histories (2,3,4). In
these instances coding for Table 1 was done by taking the major role
of these two classes of firms as controlling: All innovations by
computer manufacturing firms were attributed to "manufacturer" and
all process innovations by petroleum product and chemical manufacturing
firms attributed to "users".
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* An innovation is attributed to the user or manufacturer which first
builds and utilizes it in conformance with his economic function. Thus,
attribution to a user is made if a user builds and uses an innov-
ation before a manufacturer builds and sells a commercial version.
And conversely, attribution to a manufacturer is made if a manufacturer
builds and sells a commercial version of an innovation before a user builds
and uses a home-made version.
Sample Selection Criteria
* Most of the studies reviewed in Table 1 focus on innovations of "major
significance" (cf. Table 1 for criteria of significance used by each).
Such innovations are comparatively rare and, while there is some
evidence that minor innovations follow a pattern similar to major
(8,9)
ones this cannot be taken as a given at present.
* The innovation samples of the studies reviewed in Table 1 consist of
successful innovations only. The high level of user-designed
products and processes observed cannot therefore be used as a pre-
dictor of success: a sample of failing innovations might show an equal
- or higher or lower - incidence of user involvement.
* The bulk of the studies reviewed in Table 1 (studies 1,2, and 6-9)
judge innovation success in terms of benefit derived by the user
(" ... offers a major increment in functional utility when judged
relative to previous best practice ... ") Innovations selected on
this basis may be major commercial successes for product manufacturers
as well - but not necessarily (functionally important innovations
are not necessarily of commercial importance to their manufacturer(s)).
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Two Excluded Studies
The portfolio of studies on "the locus of innovation" is currently
so slim that it would seem folly to exclude any from the present review. I
have, however, excluded two studies from my Table 1 list of "all extant studies"
because their methodologies do not correct for a source of bias I have found to
be very important. These two studies gathered data on the locus of innovation
from only one class of potential innovator. The bias introduced by this data
collection strategy will be evident to those familiar with the aphorism, "Success
has many fathers ... " Asking only one class of potential innovators, in effect,
"Who developed this marvelous thing?" (recall Table 1 studies examined only
successful innovations) "You or someone else?" will obviously result in under
reporting of the contributions of other classes of potential innovators. One
of the two studies excluded for this reason was the Gellman Study(1 1) a study
commissioned by NSF's Science Indicators Unit as an input to their periodic
assessment of trends in US science and technological innovation, Science Indic-
ators(l2! The Gellman study polled only manufacturers - "innovating organizations"
in their terminology - for data regarding the contributions by manufacturers and
others to the innovations being examined. The second study excluded for this
reason was, unhappily, Peck's pioneering study of "The Sources of Invention in
(13)
the Postwar American Aluminum Industry " 3 ) Peck relied largely on new product
information in Modern Metals, a trade journal well regarded in the field being
studied, for his data as to the 'source of invention'. This material, I have
found(See 13) was in the main supplied to the journal editor by product manu-
facturers.
The studies reviewed in Table 1 considerably reduced this source of
bias by using direct channels to multiple classes of potential innovators.
l
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Studies 4-8 in Table 1, for example, involved searches of journals and patents,
plus interviews with expert users and manufacturers and "others" in the fields
at issue, to identify potential innovators in addition to conducting interviews
with personnel at firms first to manufacture an innovation for commercial sale.
(Channels appropriate for access to the various classes of potential innovators
are very much a function of the field being examined. Tom Duchesneau, for
example, exploring the diffusion of process machinery innovations in the shoe
industry - a field not noted for a high rate of journal publications by process
machinery users (shoe companies) - recently found that a survey of all users ask-
ing in effect "Do you know of any innovation work by users in the following
machine categories?" provided a useful means of access to information regarding
possible user-innovators (14)).
Evidence Regarding Requests for
Innovations from Users (Customers)
To this point, we have reviewed only studies which attribute an
innovation to the party which builds the first functional version. It should
be noted that this is a very conservative measure of user involvement in the
innovation process in that it ignores user inputs such as requests for innova-
tions from customers containing vague or precise specifications which, while
falling short of that criterion, may none the less be significant contributions.
I have focused on studies which use this measure, despite its conserv-
ative bias, for a simple but very important reason: Data on the source of the
first functioning version of a given innovation can often be collected retro-
spectively with far greater reliability than can data on such measures as the
presence (absence) of "Innovation Requests" by customers and any associated
specifications. The latter are evanescent and seldom documented contemporan-
eously. In contrast, a first-functioning version of an innovation tends to
leave substantial contemporaneously-generated traces such as the physical device
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itself, records of prototype construction and results, patents, publications
noting the accomplishment and its date.
Despite the difficulty of the work, however, several empirical
studies have explored the frequency with which innovation requests from
customers are associated with the decision to: Develop new industrial
products (Table 2A); engage in research which ultimately led to new industrial and
military prod4cts (Tble 2) (in the litter Studios the "cuatomer" for the
research results solicited was an engineering group). The relevant finding of
all studies of these two types which I am aware of are summarized in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 Here
(The interested reader will find a more detailed review of the studies in (22)).
Note that with one exception, these studies do not indicate the
content of the customer request. The data they provide is compatible with a
request as vague as: "Please think up a new product for me", or as precise as:
"Please make me 10,000 units of X according to my design." (The exception is the
study by von Hippel (17) In the sample examined there, it was determined that
customer requests, when present, contained complete design data for the desired
product). Even given this caveat, however, it is useful to find that the data
provided by these two types of studies are clearly congruent with the central
finding of the studies reviewed in Table 1, viz: product users play a significant
role in the innovation process in some industries - and a minimal role in others.
Some of the authors of the studies reviewed in Table 2 find the evidence for
significant user involvement in the innovation process quite striking, as do I.
For example, the Materials Advisory Board, in its discussion of the findin& of
II
von Hippel
p. 10a
Table 2: Frequency with which Manufacturers Initiated Work on an Industrial
Innovation in Response to a Customer Request.
Nature of Innovations and
Sample Selection Criteria
Data Available Regarding
n Presence of Customer Requests
A. STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Meadows (15)
Peplow (16)
von Hippel
(17)
Berger (5)
Boyden (6)
Utterback
(18)
Robinson et al.
(19)
All project initiated during 29
a two year period in "Chem Lab
B", a lab of a chemical company
with $100-300mm annual sales in
"industrial intermediates"
All "creative" projects carried 94
out during a 6 year period by an
R&D group concerned with plant
process, equipment and technique
innovations.
Semiconductor and electronic 49
subassembly manufacturing
equipment: First of type used
in commercial production (n = 7);
major improvements (n = 22);
minor improvements (n = 21).
All engineering polymers 5
developed in U.S. after 1955
with >10mm pounds produced in
1975
Chemical additives for 16
plastics: All plasticizers and
UV stabilizers developed post
World War II for use with 4
major polymers.
All scientific instrument 32
innovations mfd. by Mass. firms
which won "IR-100 Awards" 1963-
68 (n 15); Sample of other 
instruments mfd. by same firms
(n 17).
Standard and non-standard N1
industrial products purchased
by three firms
9 of 17 (53%) commercially
successful product ideas were
from customers.
30 of 48 (62%) successfully
implemented projects were
initiated in response to direct
customer request.
Source of initiative for
manufacture of equipment devel-
oped by users (n = 29) examined.
Source clearly customer request
in 21% of cases. In 46% of
cases frequent customer- manu-
facturer interaction made source
of initiative unclear.
No project-initiating request
from customers found.
No project-initiating request
from customers found.
75% initiated in response to
"need input". When need input
originated outside product
manufacturer (57%) source was
"most often" customer.
L Customers recognize need,
define functional requirements
and specific goods and services
needed before contacting
suppliers.
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Table 2: continued
Nature of Innovations and
Study Sample Selection Criteria
Data Available Regarding
n Presence of Customer Requests
B. STUDIES OF RESEARCH - ENGINEERING INTERACTION
Isenson
(Project
Hindsight)
Materials
Advisory
Board (21)
R&D accomplishments judged
key to successful development
(20) of 20 weapons systems
Materials innovations
'believed to be the result of
researTh-engineering
interaction".
710 85% initiated in response to
description of problem by
application-engineering
group.
10 in "almost all" cases the
individual with a well-defined
need initiated the communica-
tions with the basic
researchers.
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its study of innovation histories of ten important materials innovations,
such-as silicones, observes (emphasis theirs):
In all but one of the cases studied, the recognition of an
important need was identified in a majority of the events as
an important factor in bringing about the research-engineering
interaction.
** *
In almost all of the cases under consideration, it was an
individual with a well-defined need who was the initiator of
the communications. It was most frequently he who began the
dialogue with the basic researchers and determined its con-
tinuation until the need was satisfied.
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DETERMINANTS OF THE USER'S ROLE
IN THE INNOVATION PROCESS
To this point, I have presented and discussed evidence for the
fact that product and process users often play a major role in the industrial
innovation process. Next, I wish to explore current hypotheses as to "causes"
of a high - or low - level of user participation in the innovation process of a
given industry.
At this point, two hypotheses regarding the cause of a high or low
level of user participation in the industrial good innovation process are
under active consideration. (see (23) for a brief review of a third hypothesis
which seems to naturally spring to the minds of scientists.)
The first of the hypotheses, offered in somewhat different formu-
(24) (25)lations by Utterback and Abernathy and Knight , is that performance
requirements are poorly understood by manufacturers in the early stages of a
new product area, and that new product innovations in these early stages are
therefore carried out by those closest to the need, eg. users. This hypothesis
also predicts a shift from a user to manufacturer "locus of innovation" as,
over time, the needs become more generally known and well-defined. This shift
occurs, Utterback and Abernathy go on to propose, because when needs are well-
defined, the key to successful innovation becomes new technological insights -
and product manufacturers, it is suggested, have an advantage over product users
in the latter arena.
The shift in locus of innovation predicted by this first hypothesis
has been observed in three of the industries studied to date. A statistically
significant shift in the predicted direction is shown in two of the studies
summartzed in Table 1 during the time spans examined as follows: Knight 4)
showed a shift from user to manufacturer innovation as a function of time
III
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p < .001 for systems reaching new performance highs and p < .01 for systems
containing radical structural innovations (Mann-Whitney U Test); von Hippel( 9)
found process machinery innovation which were the first of a "type" (eg: the
first to be used to carry out a new "process step" in the industries studied)
to be significantly more likely to be developed by users (p < .05, 1 = 4.1)
than the major and minor improvement innovations which followed. Some indica-
(8)tion of the predicted shift is visible in the Scientific Instruments data
(basic innovations vs. major plus minor improvements to these p = .34 (Fisher
exact test), but not in the studies of petroleum processing innovation or
pultrusion process equipment innovation. (These five studies are the only
studies summarized in Table 1 which could possibly have shown the effect because
their samples included both innovations from when the product area "was new"
and later innovations.)
Given the partial success of the first hypothesis in at least
one prediction regarding the locus of innovation activity in user vs. manufacturer,
why is there interest in other hypotheses? There are two reasons. First, Many
variables in addition to clarity of desired performance specifications, such as
market size, also tend to covary with the newness of a product area, and it may
be any one or a combination of these others which actually causes the shift in
locus of innovation observed. Second, "accurate understanding of need" for a
new product or process would clearly be a difficult measure to work with experi-
mentally or operationally (whose "understanding" counts: The project engineers?
The market researchers? At what point(s) in the innovation process is accurate
·-- ·· ---·-*------^--X----^----X---- -- 
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understanding important? How can the "accuracy" of the understanding be
determined ex ante? etc.). Such difficulties lead one to rather hope that
the answer lies elsewhere.
At present, the second hypothesis as to the cause of innovation has
a rather global formulation, eg: The locus of innovation activity (and cost)
is a function of the locus of benefit from such innovation. This hypothesis,
of course, quickly reduces to that basic premise of market economics: Invest-
ment is a function of expected return. For a long time, however, it was not
clear that innovation had any relationship to such a premise. In fact, as
Schmookler(2 6 ) notes, economic theory tended to treat technological progress
as an exogenous factor - a factor not determined by economic forces - to be
introduced into economic analysis ad hoc "like war or an earthquake". Pain-
staking work by economists such as Schmookler, Mansfield (27) and others, however,
have now empirically established that economic measures such as the level of
investment in certain categories of capital equipment, and proxy measures for
innovation, such as rates of patent application bearing on those types of
capital equipment, re strongly correlated. Further, by showing that rises in
rates of invention ollow rises in rates of investment, they have been able to
provide support to the hypothesis that increases in investment cause increases
in the frequency of invention (and, presumably, related innovation) - by raising
the expected value of such.
Once it is established that invention and innovation are a function
of expected value, it is a short logical step to the hypothesis that the locus
of invention and innovation expenditure - user/or manufacturer and/or "other" -
is a function of the locus of expected benefit. Peck, in his study (13) of the
sources of invention in the aluminum industry, made a pioneering attempt to
empirically test the correlation between the amount and time-distribution of
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profits logically derivable by potential "sources" of aluminum-related-inven-
tion - producers of aluminum, producers of fabricating equipment for aluminum,
producers of products using aluminum, etc. - with the actual invention record
compiled by these sources. (While for methodological reasons mentioned prev-
iously, I don't find the study's empirical results convincing, the conceptual
contribution of the work has been very useful to succeeding workers).
Further work on the hypothesis Peck attempted to test has shown that
a successful empirical test involves formidable methodological difficulties in
addition to those he encountered, notably:
* Simply obtaining needed economic data on the costs and benefits
of innovation is very hard. (Corporations are understandably
loath to provide data on profits, etc. related to particular
products.)
* Proper attribution of costs and benefits is often difficult. (For
example, what is the proper benefit to be attributed to an inno-
vation which is sold as part of a larger system? It may contri-
bute to system sales - but how large is that contribution?)
* Making various important types of costs and benefits commensurable
is sometimes a problem. (for example, user-innovators of scientific
instruments are largely university-based scientists who are rewarded
primarily in terms of increases in understanding, reputation among
(28)
peers etc. How does one make such benefits commensurable with those
with the benefit which might induce an instrument company to innovate
- an increase in annual sales?)
Given this rather grim list of methodological difficulties, one might
well wonder how hypothesis 2 could be considered interesting. The answer is:
The benefit to a potential innovator is the benefit he can capture. Easily
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observable features of market structure and institutional factors such as
patent policy serve to put an upper bound on what an innovator can capture which
may be easily computable and be so low for some classes of potential innovators
as to allow us to predict where the locus of innovation will not be. Let me
elaborate. A user who innovates has two potential ways to capture benefit from
his innovation to compensate for innovation-related costs incurred. He may
benefit from in-house use of the innovation and/or he may benefit from the
diffusion of the innovation to others who wish to use and/or manufacture the
innovation. In the instance of the first method of capture - in-house use -
the upper bound on the percentage of total benefit available from an innovation
which a user-innovator may capture is simply determined. It is the same perc-
entage as his share of the market to which the innovation benefit applies.
(eg, if the innovation is a processing machine which reduces the cost of
manufacturing product A only, and the user-innovator manufactures 20% of all
product A, he could capture a maximum of 20% of the total benefit potentially
derivable from the innovation via in-house use. (I emphasize that share-of-
relevant-market is an upper bound to the user's benefit from in-house use
because, depending on market circumstance and company strategy, the user may
choose or be forced to pass along some of the benefits to customers or others.)
The second source of benefit potentially available to the user-innovator involves
the "capture" of some of the benefit obtained by others when they use and/or
manufacture the innovation. Mechanisms available for such capture are royalties,
license fees, sale of "know-how", etc.
Similar reasoning applies in the instance of capture of benefits by
a manufacturer-innovator: Capture via in-house manufacture and sale has an upper
bound equal to the manufacturer's market share. A share in the remaining available
benefit must be sought via royalties or other fees from other manufacturers
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and/or users. (In the instance of the independent inventor - who neither
uses his innovation nor manufactures it for sale - all benefit captured must
be via fees from manufacturers and/or users.)
Clearly, many different strategies for capture are available as a
(29)
function of market structure, patentability of a given innovation, etc.
In principle, this plethora of options could lead to difficulty in predicting -
as opposed to explaining post hoc - the locus of innovation in any particular
industry. In practice, however, I speculate that, in many industries, capture
of benefits resulting from non in-house activity by user or manufacturer is
either restricted to a few clear mechanisms (eg. licensing in chemicals) or
absent. (In my studies of scientific instrument (8 ) and process equipment
innovations(9'16) I have seldom found any capture of benefit by innovators
other than via in-house use. Patents were either seldom applied for (scientific
instruments) or the innovations were of such a nature that patents could easily
be skirted by imitators (process machinery). Other possible mechanisms for
capture (eg. effective brand-name "franchise") were also largely ineffective in
these industries.) (30)
Without an ability to prevent imitation or share in the benefits
derived from imitation, the potential benefit to some classes of innovators can,
as I mentioned above, have an exceedingly low upper bound. In the pultrusion
industry, for example, total sales of pultruded product distributed among
approximately 30 users of pultrusion machinery were found by Lionetta and
(7)
von Hippel to be approximately $60 million in 1976. Sales of pultrusion
machinery by the single commercial builder of such were found to have climbed to
a plateau of only $300 thousand annually. (Many users in this industry build
their own process equipment). Machine manufacturers and users alike were seen
unable to protect their innovations by patent or other means in this industry.
This observation plus the relative sales volume of users and manufacturer
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observed seems to me to be a reasonable, hypothesis 2-based, explanation for our
finding that 85% of the innovations sampled had a user source (It is also a
reason to suggest that, in this industry, the shift in the locus of innovation
predicted by hypothesis 1 would not occur unless and until the ability of the
manufacturer to capture benefit from innovation costs incurred improves.
Currently, total before-tax pultrusion-related profits - a potential source of
additional R and D funding - is on the order of $7 million annually for the
total user community versus only $30-40 thousand annually for the single commercial
manufacturer of pultrusion equipment.)
The above outlines why I think further research under the rubric of
hypothesis 2 holds interest and promise of allowing prediction of the role of
the user in the innovation process or, more broadly, the locus of innovation
activity. At the moment, however, the argument is clearly speculative.
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IMPLICATIONS
As I noted at the beginning of this paper, the fact of varying user
and manufacturer involvement in the industrial innovation process is currently
clear but the cause of these variations is not. And, as the reader will under-
stand from the discussion in the preceeding section, a good deal more research
remains to be done before the cause(s) is well understood. Fortunately, many
major implications for innovation research and practice may be derived from the
fact of user and manufacturer loci of innovation development (which may be
empirically determined for any industry of interest), even if the cause is unknown.
This is so because knowledge of where innovation occurs is an essential prerequi-
site to effective management of the process by those working at the firm, industry
or government level. In the remaining paragraphs of this paper I will suggest a
few implications of the findings regarding the locus of innovation, starting with
implications for the firm and then moving to implications for government.
Implications for the Firm
Users and manufacturers share the industrial innovation process no
matter which party is the "source" of an innovation - the manufacturer picking
up the work where the user leaves off. As I noted at the beginning of the paper,
the currently prevailing assumption among practitioners of innovations in indust-
rial firms - and of the prescriptive, "how to develop new products" literature
addressed to them (10)_ is that the user's share in the innovation process is
simply to have "needs" which the manufacturer can explore via marketing research.
Yet, as we have seen in this paper, in some industries the user's role is typically
far greater, involving the design and fabrication of a "home built" version of
the innovation and proof of its value via field use.
Clearly, a manufacturing (or using) firm facing the latter situation
should organize its innovation effort differently than would be appropriate in
the
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former situation: Both what the firm should be looking for at the user-
manufacturer innovation activity interface and what the firm itself should do
are significantly changed. Consider the following changes which might logically
be prescribed for a manufacturing firm wishing to switch its innovation activities
from manufacturer-sourced to user-sourced innovations:
* Marketing research, now chartered to seek need data, analyze it,
develop responsive "product concepts" and estimate market sizes,
would be reoriented to search out data on user prototypes, analyze
the utility these have displayed in field: use, and estimate their
potential as commercial products.
* The sales force, now designed primarily to disseminate information
on present products, would acquire the added function of acquiring
information on! promising user prototypes during visits to customer
facilities.
* R and D, now motivated and staffed to develop a product from
concept data supplied by marketing research, would be reoriented to
perform only product engineering work on user prototypes.
Obviously, each of these changes in the established role of an organizational
group requires related changes in the interests and skills of group members,
and so on. For example, salesmen are now neither trained nor motivated (sales
compensation systems generally reward large volume sales of existing products,
not possible sales of future products) to seek user prototypes or report back
what they see. And R and D groups are presently staffed by people trained and
motivated to do the entire product development job, rather than by product
design specialists only.
Clearly, the finding that users often undertake a major role in the
innovation process in a given industry will have major implications for
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innovation-related practice for firms participating in that industry.
Implications for Government
Government has a major and pervasive impact on the innovation
process. It is a major funder of R and D, a major purchaser of innovative products,
and it sets the ground rules according to which others may innovate (FDA) and be
rewarded for innovation (patent policy). When it is demonstrated that, in
certain industries, users rather than manufacturers undertake the bulk of the
innovation work, some problems which have traditionally concerned government policy
makers will disappear and others (alas) will emerge. An example in each category:
* Government, correctly cognizant that innovation in process
equipment plays a major role in the economy's improvement in
productivity, has often cast a worried eye at the fact that
producers of many types of process equipment (eg. machine tools)
tend to be small and financially unable to support sophisticated
(31)R and D programs This fact, I suggest, will cease to be
worrisome if and when it is demonstrated - as we have already
seen done for some classes of process machinery - that manufacturers
of many classes of such equipment seldom innovate themselves,
but simply provide the manufacturing function for innovative users.
* Government has tended not to worry when firms which use innovative
industrial goods and are labor intensive (eg. textiles) depart US
shores. After all, it is reasoned, the comparative advantage of
our economy does not lie with goods of a high labor content - and
we will still sell such off-shore industries the sophisticated
capital goods they need. It has been observed in two industries,
however, (4,17) that innovative process plant and machinery devel-
oped by users is very likely to be transferred to machine builders
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in the same country. An implication which government may find
wise to test is: In the case of industries characterized by user
dominated innovation patterns, does the departure of users of
innovative industrial goods from the U.S. result
in the decline of domestic manufacturers of such goods due to the
inaccessibility of innovative users?
Problems resulting from the finding that the locus of innovation
activity is an innovation process variable can only be seen and addressed when
data on the locus of innovation is available. A first priority for government,
therefore, is to get its measures of the locus of innovation activity in order.
(Currently, as I noted in the methods section, data for NSF's Science Indicators
are gathered in a manner which contains an inbuilt bias toward the finding that
the manufacturer is the innovator.) Next, given the high government interest
in and impact on innovation processes, further research on the locus of
innovation activity as a strong, operationally malleable process would seem
of potential value.
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